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RECENT CASES
Administrative LawSEC FORMULA OF JOINING NONREGISTRANTS
AS PARTIES TO REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS
HELD INVALID
In a proceeding under § 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 1 for revocation of an over-the-counter broker's registration, 2 the
SEC compelled a nonregistered salesman of the broker to be joined as a
party to the action in order that a declaratory order as to his willful
violation of the act could be made. This finding of the salesman's willful
violation could be used in the future to deny him registration as a brokerdealer or to deny him membership in or employment by a national securities
association.3 The salesman appealed the compulsory joinder, and the
circuit court held that the commission had exceeded its statutory authority
because § 15 (b) of the act applies only to registrants and applicants. 4 For
nonregistrants, the court said that the act provides for the obtaining of an
injunction or the reporting of evidence to the Attorney General for criminal prosecution, 5 and the SEC can employ the findings of such trials as
1. Section 15(b) of the Act provides: ".
. The Commission shall, after appropriate notice and opportunity for hearing, by order deny registration to or revoke
the registration of a broker or dealer if it finds that such denial or revocation
is in the public interest and that (1) such broker or dealer whether prior or subsequent to becoming such, or (2) any partner, officer, director, or branch manager
of such broker or dealer (or any person occupying a similar status or performing
similar functions), or any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by
such broker or dealer, whether prior or subsequent to becoming such . . . (B)
has been convicted within ten years preceding the filing of any such application
or at any time thereafter of any felony or misdemeanor involving the purchase or
sale of any security or arising out of the conduct of the business of a broker or
dealer; or (C) is permanently or temporarily enjoined by order, judgment, or decree
of any court of competent jurisdiction from engaging in or continuing any conduct
or practice in connection with the purchase or sale of any security; or (D) has
willfully violated any provision of (the Securities Act of 1933, as amended), or of
this chapter, or of any rule or regulation thereunder ...
"
15 U.S.C. § 78 o(b)
(1946).
2. Over-the-counter brokers are those who do business otherwise than on a
national securities exchange. For a simplified explanation of the process see Lesh,
Federal Regulation of Over-the-Counter Brokers and Dealers in Securities, 59 HARV.
L. REv. 1237 (1946).
3. Section 15A(b) (4) of the act provides that no association which is a member
of a national securities association may admit or keep as a member any broker-dealer
who is subject to an SEC order denying or revoking his registration or who caused
such an order or if anyone controlled by or controlling such broker-dealer is subject
to or was the cause of such order. 15 U.S.C. §78o 3(b)(4) (1946).
4. The instant case is the first judicial review of this procedure.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1946) (Commission may obtain a district court injunction
against any person upon proper showing that he "is engaged or about to engage in
any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of the provisions
of this chapter, or of any rule or regulation thereunder . . ." The commission
may report its findings to the Attorney General whose discretion it is to prosecute).
(395)
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grounds for denial of registration.6 Wallach v. SEC, 202 F.2d 462 (D.C.
Cir. 1953).
Section 15(b) of the instant statute provides for registration of overthe-counter broker-dealers. One of the four grounds for revoking or
denying registration is an SEC finding of a previous willful violation of
the act by the broker or one controlled by or controlling him. An enforcement difficulty arose where applicants never previously registered had been
employed by a firm whose registration had been revoked earlier. The
hearings on the applicant's possible past violation presented the problems
of unavailable witnesses, disappearing evidence, a time-consuming retrial
of issues, and less reliable proof of the applicant's actions. These difficulties were overcome by compelling nonregistrants to become parties to the
original revocation proceedings and making declaratory orders as to their
willful violation or their being a cause of a revocation or denial order. 7
This method allowed the nonregistrant to present evidence in the original
action, cross-examine witnesses, and appeal the SEC findings. 8 The instant
court did not examine the possible rational statutory basis of the improvised SEC procedure in view of its finding that procedures directly
in the statute were sufficient for enforcement. Thus, the fact that the
procedure was adopted originally by adjudication rather than by the SEC's
formal rule-making powers 9 was not a factor entering into the court's
decision. Since the procedure had its inception prior to the joinder of the
appellant in the instant case,' 0 the element of retroactivity was not present
to hinder the legality of the procedure. However, if the commission had
used rule-making to set up the joinder procedure, the appellant would have
had an oportunity to contest it before its adoption," rather than contesting
it in the revocation hearing after its adoption. A general hearing before
the procedure's adoption might have served to give more weight to the
commission interpretation, but because the court propounded an independent judicial review based on the lack of statutory authority, it appears
that the court would have given little weight to the administrative interpretation no matter how the procedure was originally adopted.' 2 It is
to be doubted also whether a procedure regarding when to join nonregistrants in registration proceedings could be adapted to the rigidity and
3
inflexibility of a formal rule.'
6. See note 1 supra.
7. This procedure was instituted in W.H. Bell & Co., SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 4292, Aug. 5, 1949 (proceedings dismissed when nonregistrant
died). For the commission's reasons for this procedure, see Henry P. Rosenfeld,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4404, Feb. 7, 1950.
8. 18 SEC ANN. REP. 62 (1952).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78w (1946).
10. See note 7 supra.
11. Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act defines the process for making
rules. 60 STAT. 238, 5 U.S.C. § 1003 (1946).
12. Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 297
U.S. 129, 134 (1936); see Lincoln Electric Co. Employees' Profit-Sfiaring Trust v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 190 F.2d 326, 330 (6th Cir. 1951).
13. It would seem desirable, in a case of agency internal procedure such as presented here, to allow the SEC complete discretion on an adjudication-by-adjudication
basis to join or not to join nonregistrants.
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Alternate grounds for denial of registration to a broker-dealer are the
existence of an injunction or criminal conviction. 14 The instant decision
purported to compel the commission to apply these grounds for denial to
enforce a third, entirely separate ground, i.e., an administrative finding of a
willful violation. The court admitted that the commission procedure might
have been upheld had the Act provided no means to alleviate the SEC's
difficulties. 1 When the words of a statute produce an unreasonable result
plainly at variance with the policy of the act, courts will follow the latter.16
The overruled SEC formula, though not directly provided for in the statute, seems to be a reasonable administrative interpretation to enforce the
provision for denial of registration. The declaratory order method for the
agencies has received congressional authorization, 17 and was employed here
to' settle a controversy required in the statute to be determined on the
record after an agency hearing.' 8 Although declaratory orders are usually
granted upon the request of private parties, it does not seem to be a departure from congressional policy for an agency to utilize such orders on its
own motion for the purpose of enforcing a statutory provision. The right
to use the improvised procedure is substantiated by the fact that the court's
injunctive and criminal alternatives, derived from the statute, do not aid the
SEC in cases where their difficulties arise. The tests for obtaining an injunction or a criminal conviction differ from the test for finding a willful
violation. A reasonable likelihood of future violations must be shown before a court will grant an injunction.' 9 Also, injunctions are normally
granted only for violations existing when the suit is begun and not for
past violations.2° Finally, the act provides that injunctions no longer in
effect cannot be the basis for denial of registration.2 ' On the other hand,
denial can be ordered upon an SEC finding of a violation committed at any
time, and a likelihood of future violations need not be found.2 The alternative of criminal prosecution is subject to the three-year statute of limitations,23 and may not be grounds for denial if occurring more than ten years
14.
15.
16.
United
17.

See note 1 supra.
Instant case at 463.
United States v. Rosenblum Truck Lines, Inc., 315 U.S. 50, 55 (1942);
States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940).
Section 5(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act. 60 STAT. 240, 5 U.S.C.

§ 1004(d) (1946).

18. For a discussion of the advantages of an administrative agency's use of
declaratory orders, see Electrolux Corp., 286 N.Y. 390, 36 N.E.2d 633 (1941).
19. SEC v. Universal Service Ass'n, 106 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1939).
20. Fleming v. National Bank of Commerce of Charleston, 41 F. Supp. 833
(D. W. Va. 1941) ; see SEC v. Torr, 22 F. Supp. 602, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1938). But cf.
SEC v. Lawson, 24 F. Supp. 360, 364 (D. Md. 1938). See, Hearings before Commnittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 4344, H.R. 5065, and H.R.
5832, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 1294 (1941) (joint proposal by SEC, National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc., and New York Curb and Stock Exchanges for amendment
of the act to allow injunctions for past violations).
21. 15 U.S.C. §78o(b) (2) (C) (1946) ; Loss, SEcuiTIEs REGULATION 729 (1951)
22. Norris & Hirshberg, Inc. v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
23. 18 U.S.C. §3282 (Supp. 1952).
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prior to the nonregistrant's application.2 In addition, the violation of the
act in a criminal proceeding must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
whereas commission findings have been held not even to need proof by a fair
preponderance of the evidence,2 5 and are conclusive on appeal if supported
by substantial evidence.Finally, because criminal prosecution brings a
harsh penalty and is in the Attorney General's discretion, the government
many times declines to bring criminal action when it feels that administra27
tive or injunctive proceedings are sufficent punishment.
Practically, the nonregistrant has a substantial interest in an original
revocation proceeding, since he loses his present employment if his employer's registration is revoked; and, if found to be a willful violator, he
will have a difficult time in finding a new position, inasmuch as any em28
ployer risks losing his registration upon the hiring of such a nonregistrant.
Furthermore, as a result of the instant case, the SEC now uses in proceedings involving the nonregistrant or his employer the record of the original

proceedings concerning the nonregistrant, even though that party was not
present to cross-examine testimony as to his willful violation; 29 the nonregistrant has no grounds to appeal the findings of the second proceeding
if he elected not to become a party to the hearing.30 This use of the old

record can virtually prevent the nonregistrant from obtaining another position in the securities business, retaining his present one, or getting a complete hearing on application for registration, although he has never appeared before the agency. 3 1 And, if the court's solution were employed,
missing evidence and unavailable witnesses when the nonregistrant applies
in the future may force the granting of registration because of inability to
prove a past violation, although such violation had been grounds for
revocation of the nonregistrant's employer in the past. Such results seem
unreasonable and plainly at variance with the policy of the act as a whole
and of the registration provision, which is to allow denial for violation at
any time in the past and to effectively regulate the over-the-counter
3 2

markets.

24. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (2) (B) (1946) (Although the SEC may not use a past
injunction or a criminal conviction over ten years old as grounds for denial, there
is a question as to whether a conviction or injunction may be used as evidence of
previous willful violation. However, that procedure would circumvent the intent
of the provision not to use them as basis for denial).
25. Wright v. SEC, 112 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1940).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78y (1946) ; Wright v. SEC, 112 F.2d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 1940).
27. Herlands, Criminal Law Aspects of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
21 VA. L. Rxv. 139, 196 (1934); 17 SEC ANN. R P-.277 (1951).
28. Securities National Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4866,
May 29, 1953 (Because it employed the appellant in the instant case, corporation's
license was revoked by the SEC).
29. Mason, Moran & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4832,
April 23, 1953 (one dissent) ; R. H. Johnson & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 4841, April 29, 1953 (one dissent). For the apparent authority to use
records of previous proceedings in future hearings, see rule 5(e), Rules of Practice
for the SEC, 15 U.S.C. following § 78u (Supp. 1952).
30. Wallach v. SEC, 206 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
31. See notes 28, 29, 30 supra.
32. H.R. REP. No. 2601, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936).
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AdmiraltyCOURT CREATES EXCEPTION IN PUBLIC VESSELS
ACT FOR COAST GUARD NEGLIGENCE
IN RESCUE OPERATIONS
A Coast Guard ship was ordered to tow libelant's drifting barge to the
nearest harbor after a storm had severed it from its tug. While entering
the harbor in clear weather, the Coast Guard ship cut its towline to the
barge when both vessels were imperiled near the breakwater, and libelant's
barge was damaged. Libelant sued the United States under the Public
Vessels Act I for negligence, and the district court, finding both vessels
negligent, awarded one-half damages. 2 The circuit court reversed, ruling
for public policy reasons, that the United States is not liable for Coast
Guard fault in rescue operations. To hold otherwise would severely impair
the effectiveness of such operations and the morale of the service personnel.
Dougherty Co. v. United States, 207 F.2d 626 (3d Cir. 1953) (alternative
holding by 4-3 decision).3
Although several suits have been brought under the Public Vessels
Act for Coast Guard negligence in rescue operations, 4 the instant case is
the first to decide the question of government liability in this situation. For
many years suits were brought against the government under the act only
for damage by collision,5 but in 1945 the Supreme Court held that private
parties may recover for non-collision damage caused by a public vessel's
negligence, 6 stating the congressional adoption of the extremely broad
statutory language of the Public Vessels Act was deliberate and therefore
not to be restrictively interpreted.7 The Court further said that, except
for seizure and in rem liability, the United States has assumed the same
liability which admiralty law places on the private shipowner.8 Numerous
suits for public vessels' negligence resulted, 9 and under this doctrine the
1. The pertinent section of the act provides: "A libel in personam in admiralty
may be brought against the United States . . . for damages caused by a public
vessel of the United States. . . ." 43 STAT. 1112 (1925), 46 U.S.C. § 781 (1946).
2. Dougherty Co. v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 287 (D. Del. 1951).
3. The two other holdings were that the Coast Guard ship's actions were only
a condition, not a cause of the accident; and that the sole cause was libellant's
negligence.
4. For a complete listing of these cases, see footnote 12 of the instant case.
These suits have either been voluntarily dismissed or are still pending. One court,
finding no negligence, declined to decide the question of Government liability for
Coast Guard negligence in a rescue operation. Page v. United States, 105 F. Supp.
99 (E.D. La. 1952).
5. E.g., Haug v. United States, 5 F. Supp. 418 (W.D. Wash. 1933) (Navy ship
collided with fishing boat) ; The City of Rome, 38 F.2d 782 (2d Cir. 1930)

(sub-

marine collided with libellant's ship).
6. Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215 (1945).
7. Id. at 222.

8. Ibid. "In accepting this in personam liability, the United States puts itself
merely on a level with the private shipowners." RoBINSON, HANDBOOK oF ADIMALTY
LAW IN THE UNITED STATEs 267 (1939).
9. E.g., United States v. The Australia Star, 172 F.2d 472 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 823 (1949) ; Lind v. United States, 156 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1946).
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Government has been held liable for Coast Guard negligence.10 These
suits and a later case allowing recovery for personal injury 11 indicate a
trend of interpretation to give the widest possible scope of recovery under
the act. Moreover, cases which have held that injured parties may not
recover for land damages by public vessels 2 or for injury to a government
employee 1- cannot be deemed restrictive interpretations, as the former is
not an admiralty situation and the employee in the latter had another statutory remedy. This wide interpretation of the act by the earlier decisions
follows the legislative intent which, although not deducible for the situation
in the instant case, shows that the act was meant to cover damage by any
Government-owned vessel. 14 It is also significant that a letter from the
Secretary of the Treasury (whose department includes the Coast Guard),
which was included in the House report, 15 expressed complete approval
of the act without mention of qualification for rescue instances, and that
Congress specifically provided for exceptions in the act without including
the rescue field.'0
The court in the instant case, despite this history of broad interpretation, stated that public policy necessitates an exception to the act in rescue
cases to protect the public interest of preserving the ships of the seas
and the morale of the Coast Guard. The only authority for this rationale
is earlier dicta that public policy encourages rescue operations. 17 But in
Workman v. New York City,' 8 where it was held that a city is liable for

its fireboat's negligence in a fire-extinguishing operation, the court rejected
an argument based on policy considerations similar to those of the instant
case. Despite the pressure on the crew and the public interest in extinguishing fires, the court found that recovery for negligence would not be
an undue hindrance to the effectiveness of the emergency function of fire10. Ladd v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Va. 1951), aff'd, 193 F2d 929
(4th Cir. 1952) (wake of Coast Guard ship tipped over libellant's ship).
11. American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947).
12. Maine v. United States, 45 F. Supp. 35 (D. Me. 1942), aff'd, 134 F.2d 574
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 772 (1943).
Congress later provided that the
United States is liable for damage done on land by a public vessel. 62 STAT. 496
(1948), 46 U.S.C. §740 (Supp. 1952).
13. Johansen v. United States, 343 U.S. 427 (1952).
14. H.R. REP. No. 913, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924).
15. Id. at 9, 10.
16. The act provides: "The United States shall be entitled to the benefits of all
exemptions and of all limitations of liability accorded by law to the owners, charterers,
operators, or agents of vessels." 43 STAT. 1113 (1925), 46 U.S.C. § 789 (1946).
Thus, the United States receives the exceptions accorded to private shipowners under
the existing statutes.

ROBiNSON, op. cit. supra note 8, at 267.

17. See The Island City, 66 U.S. 121, 130 (1861) ; The S. C. Schenk, 158 Fed.
54, 60 (6th Cir. 1907). But a ccurt may not allow the skill and heroism of an armed
service branch to control the decision of a judicial question or obviate the settled
rules of statutory interpretation. Dewey v. United States, 178 U.S. 510 (1900).
In the instant case at page 642 of his dissent, Chief Judge Biggs states: ".

.

. I

cannot help but believe that the majority is substituting sentiment for the plain
provisions of the Public Vessels Act."
18. 179 U.S. 552 (1900).
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boats.19 In addition, it is somewhat dubious just how great an effect
recovery for rescue negligence would have on Coast Guard morale. Under
service regulations rescue accidents, depending on the type, are carefully
scrutinized either by a marine board of investigation sitting together with a
Coast Guard board, 20 by an appointed board of inquiry, 2 ' or by courtmartial proceedings.2 2 Thus, regardless of admiralty court findings, the
serviceman already realizes that any negligent actions will be thoroughly
investigated, and that disciplinary action or retarded promotion may result.
The public policy in regard to government liability for the torts
committed by those in its service also indicates an opposite result here.
This policy, as indicated by Congress, shows a strong feeling that the old
theory of sovereign immunity leads to injustices, and is no longer tenable
in this era of expansion of government functions into what were previously private fields.2 In allowing recovery for personal injury under the
Public Vessels Act, the Supreme Court has noted that this act, the Suits
in Admiralty Act, 24 and the Federal Tort Claims Act 25 are evidence of a
legislative policy to hold the Government liable for its employees' torts.2
Rescue operation is only another instance of the Government's entrance
into a formerly private field.2 7 While the company whose ship had been
left at sea could have recovered for damages for negligence by a private
rescuer, 28 now, contrary to earlier constructions of the act which stated
29
that the United States had assumed the liability of the private shipowner,
the company must itself bear the loss when inflicted by Coast Guard negligence. It must, however, be noted that the Coast Guard, contrary to the
practice of private rescuers, makes no charge for salvage service. The
instant case thus presents the first court-imposed exception to the Public
Vessels Act, and a reversal of the courts' previous liberal construction in
favor of the private parties. The exception may well begin a new trend
of exemptions ostensibly to protect the interests of the Naval and Coast
Guard services.
19. The analogy is applicable here, even though the injured vessel was not the
object the fireboat was trying to save.
20. 46 CoDE FED. REos. § 136.07 (Rev. ed. 1952).
21. 64 STAT. 143 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 731 (Supp. 1952).
22. 64 STAT. 139 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 704(b) (Supp. 1952).
23. H.R. REP. No. 913, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1924). For a complete discussion of the development of this policy, see Anderson, Tort and Implied Contract Liability of the Federal Government, 30 MI N. L. REV. 133 (1946).
24. 41 STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 741-52 (1946).
25. 60 STAT. 843, 28 U.S.C. §931(a) (1946), as amended, 62 STAT. 983 (1948),
28 U.S.C. §2674 (Supp. 1952).
26. American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947).
27. Reply Brief for Libellant, p. 5. Commercial salvors formerly maintained
tugs in every harbor for the purpose of rescue work for compensation agreed to or
fixed later by arbitration or litigation. These tugs would render salvage service

to imperiled ships after the Coast Guard had rescued the people in danger. But the
Coast Guard's services were subsequently expanded to include towage of property to
the harbor. 63 STAT. 501 (1949), 14 U.S.C. § 18 (Supp. 1952).
28. See cases cited in instant case at 633, n.20 (majority opinion), and in Part
III of Judge Biggs' dissent.
29. See text at note 8 supra.
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AdmiraltySHIPOWNER LIABLE ON UNSEAWORTHINESS
THEORY FOR INJURY TO LONGSHOREMAN
DUE TO THE EQUIPMENT OF THE STEVEDORING
CONTRACTOR AND ON A PORTION OF THE
SHIP UNDER THEIR CONTROL
Libelant, an employee of a stevedoring company was injured when a
block, brought on a ship by the company,' broke while he was engaged in
loading the ship. The injury occurred on a portion of the ship under the
control of the stevedoring company. Libelant brought an action against
the owner of the ship on the theory that the block was unseaworthy; he was
denied recovery on the grounds that the block was not a part of the ship's
equipment and that the ship was seaworthy when control was surrendered.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the fact
that the block did not belong to the ship, or that the owner of the ship had
surrendered control to the stevedoring company would not relieve him from
liability, since he has an absolute non-delegable duty to provide a ship seaworthy in all aspects. Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co., 205 F.2d 478 (9th
Cir. 1953).
Under the doctrine of unseaworthiness, shipowners are absolutely
liable 2 for injuries to seamen caused by failure to provide all necessary and
customary requisites for navigation, including proper equipment and a
competent crew. 3 In 1946, the Supreme Court in Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki 4 extended the doctrine to longshoreman working on the ship, on
the theory that they were engaged in a task which was formerly the obligation of the seaman, although previously longshoremen could recover only
for the negligence of the shipowner.5 Since the Sieracki case, the lower
courts have continued to increase the scope of the liability of the owner: a
longshoreman injured on land was permitted to recover under the same
theory,6 and the term longshoreman has been extended to permit recovery
by workers other than those historically accepted within the definition of
longshoreman. 7 However, even after Sieracki, one exception to the general
1. Since it was not clear to whom the block belonged, the court assumed for
the purpose of the appeal that it was brought on board by the stevedoring company.
Instant case at 479.
2. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944); The Osceola, 189 U.S.
158 (1903).
3. Adams v. Bortz, 279 Fed. 521 (2d Cir. 1922).
4. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
5. Greco v. Lorentzen, 139 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1943); The Etna, 43 F. Supp.
303 (E.D. Pa. 1942); The Dalhem, 41 F. Supp. 718 (D. Mass. 1941); The S.S.
Anderson, 37 F. Supp. 695 (D. Md. 1941).
6. Strika v. Netherlands Ministry of Traffic, 185 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1950).
7. Read v. United States, 201 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1953) (employee of boiler
cleaning company); Hawn v. Pope & Talbot, 198 F.2d 800 (3d Cir. 1952) (carpenter); Capadona v. The Lake Atlin, 101 F. Supp. 851 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (tankerman); Bochantin v. Inland Waterways Corp., 96 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Mo. 1951)
(employee of a shipper) ; Landgraf v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 58 (E.D. Pa.
1947) (carpenter). There are also cases which indicate that recovery would have
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rule had been that once the shipowner had released control in a seaworthy
condition to the stevedoring contractor of that portion of the ship where
the injury occurred, he was absolved from liability for any unseaworthy
condition created thereafter by the contractor.8
The necessity of control as a requisite to the liability of the shipowner
to the longshoreman for unseaworthiness was adopted from a case, which
being prior to Sieracki, involved the negligence of the shipowner. 9 With
the decision by the Supreme Court that the owner's liability to longshoremen was absolute,' it has been suggested," and the instant case decides,
that the "control" cases were improperly decided because the shipowner's
2
lack of control or ability to prevent the accident is irrelevant to liability.'
Regardless of the terminology employed, however, the purpose of any
doctrine of liability would seem to be not only to compensate the seaman
for injury, but also to encourage the shipowner to provide an adequate ship
for his crew. If liability is to be imposed when he has no control over the
situation, then the idea of prevention with respect to the shipowner be13
comes a nullity, a conclusion not reflected by the history of the doctrine.
His liability seems to be only for the purpose of providing another solvent
defendant. Prevention is retained, however, by making the stevedoring
contractor liable to the shipowner on an implied contract of indemnity, 14
been allowed if the ship had been unseaworthy. Meyers v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co.,
165 F.2d 642 (6th Cir. 1948) (employee of dry dock owner); Christiansen v.
United States, 94 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1951) (cleaner) ; Eagle Indemnity Co. v.
United States Lines, 86 F. Supp. 949 (D. Md. 1949) (ship ceiler). The Second
Circuit, however, has refused to broaden the doctrine, restricting it to men who load
and unload ships. O'Connell v. Naess, 176 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1949).
8. Mollica v. Compania Sud-Americana, 202 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 965 (1953); Lopez v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 201 F.2d 418
(3d Cir. 1953); Lynch v. United States, 163 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1947); Lauro v.
United States, 162 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1947) ; 2 NoRRIs, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 622
(1952).
9. Grasso v. Lorentzen, 149 F.2d 127 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 743
(1945).
10. "It is essentially a species of liability without fault, analogous to other
well known instances in our law. Derived from and shaped to meet the hazards
which performing the service imposes, the liability is neither limited by the conceptions of negligence nor contractual in character." Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,
328 U.S. 85, 94 (1946).
11. See the concurring opinion in Lauro v. United States, 162 F.2d 32, 35 (2d
Cir. 1947) ; Note, 26 TEXAs L. REv. 517, 520-2 (1948).
12. Instant case at 479-80.
13. See Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 103 (1944) for the bases
of absolute liability for seamen.
14. A seaman (or longshoreman) may sue the shipowner on both a negligence
and unseaworthy theory. *McCarthy v. American Eastern Corp., 175 F.2d 724 (3d
Cir. 1949). Since there is no contribution between joint tortfeasors in non-collision
admiralty cases, Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952), the
least finding of negligence on the part of the owner will prevent him from recovering against the contractor, and in many instances the courts have little difficulty in
barring the shipowner on this theory. Read v. United States, 201 F.2d 758, 762 (3d
Cir. 1953).
Consequently, the implied contracts of indemnity would seem less
efficacious than the control doctrine as an incentive for the contractor to exercise
care in his work.
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but only if the contractor's negligence is the cause of the injury.15 Congress
has already indicated its policy for stevedores in the Longshoreman's and
Harbor Workers' Act 16 by placing the liability for injuries upon the contractor without proof of fault; arguments that its provisions are inadequate 1 7 would seem to require a political solution in amendment of the Act,
rather than a judicial one in expanding the liability to the shipowner. In
addition, even granting that control over a section of the ship may be of no
significance in determining liability, the court has even eliminated the question of control when the stevedoring company's equipment is involved.
Although the courts have gone to extremes in finding unseaworthiness, i '
it has previously arisen from a condition or appliance directly connected
with the ship, 19 and in fact they have expressly negated attempts to incorporate equipment of contractors as appliances of the ship. 20 Nor does
the court in the instant case support its decision with adequate precedent,
since in both cases relied upon, 2 ' the defective appliance was admittedly a
part of the ship's equipment. The reasons for strict liability-the alleged
hazards of the sea, the necessity of using equipment furnished by the owner
and the stringent discipline while on board the ship-may provide adequate
reasons for a seaman's protection and indemnity, 22 but since they are rather
tenuous 2 when applied in port to longshoreman, there would seem to be
no legitimate reason for broadening the scope of the doctrine as applied
to longshoremen beyond its previous application to seamen. Indeed, the
entire doctrine seems distorted in changing the basis of liability from
negligence to absolute merely because the locale of the injury is a vessel
rather than on land, since generally an employer of a contractor on land
would not be liable for injuries to the contractor's servants in the absence
24
of negligence on his part.
15. Read v. United States, 201 F.2d 758, 763 (3d Cir. 1953); Rich v. United
States, 177 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1949).
16. 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. 901 (Supp. 1952).
17. See Bean, Choice of Remedies by Injured Maritime Workers, 1 NACCA
L.J. 74, 77 (1948).
18. Krey v. United States, 123 F.2d 1008 (2d Cir. 1941) (soapy shower floor);
Keen v. Overseas Tanksbip Corp., 194 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1952) and Jones v. Lykes
Bros. S.S. Co., 108 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (vicious crew members).
19. See cases collected in 2 NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN §§ 609-614 (1952);
ROBINsON, ADMtALTY

301-7 (1939).

20. Rogers v. United States Lines, 205 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1953) ; Signore v. The

Ferngulf, 103 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); See Brabazon v. Belships Co., 202
F.2d 904, 908 (3d Cir. 1953).
21. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946) (tackle) ; Mahnich v.
Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944) (rope).
22. See note 13 supra.
23. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 103 (dissenting opinion);
Howe, Rights of Maritime Workers, 6 NACCA L.J. 131, 140-1 (1950).

24. Brooks v. United States, 194 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1952); Union Tank &
Supply Co. v. Kelley, 167 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1948); Sun Oil Co. v. Kneten, 164
F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1947); American Steel & Wire Co. v. Sieraski, 119 F.2d 709
(6th Cir. 1941); Note, 44 A.L.R. 891 (1926).

19541

RECENT CASES

Constitutional LawFINDING OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFLUENCE
AUTHORIZES CIVIL COURT INTERFERENCE
IN CHURCH AFFAIRS
The Russian Orthodox Church is a hierarchical' form of religious
society, with the supreme governing authority, presently the Patriarch,
traditionally being located in Moscow. In 1905 Saint Nicholas Cathedral
in New York City was dedicated as the central place of worship in America,
to be occupied by the ruling archbishop of the American Diocese. Prior to
the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, the American segment of the Church had
unquestionably subjected itself to the supremacy of the central authority in
2
Moscow, which had for centuries been under the control of the Czar.
When the new Communist regime displayed extreme hostility toward the
Church, Patriarch Tikhon, in 1920, issued a ukase which authorized the
outlying dioceses to assume the hierarchical power in the event the central
church should cease to function, but further provided that any action taken
under this ukase was to be subject to confirmation by the central church
when re-established. After Tikhon was imprisoned by the Soviets and his
authority assumed by the schismatic Renovated Church,3 the American
Diocese convened in 1924 and, pursuant to the 1920 ukase, declared itself
temporarily autonomous, leaving its final status to be determined by any
properly constituted sobor 4 of the Church. Although the Renovated
Church soon disappeared, Tikhon, after his release from prison in 1923,
could never fully regain his authority, but prior to his death in 1925 did
appoint three clerics as locum tenens r of the Patriarchate. One of these,
Sergius, in 1927 concluded an agreement with the Soviet Government under
which the Church's central office was allowed to reopen after it had pledged
its loyalty to the U.S.S.R. and promised to secure similar pledges from the
Church clergy abroad. After several attempts at reconciliation with the
American faction failed, Sergius appointed Benjamin as ruling archbishop
of the American Diocese. This appointment was never recognized by the
1. "Hierarchical churches may be defined as those organized as a body with other
churches having similar faith and doctrine with a common ruling convocation or
ecclesiastical head." Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 110 (1953).
2. Prior to 1700, the Church had been ruled by the Patriarch, who was elected
by a convocation of Church clerics. In that year, Peter the Great abolished the
Patriarchate and established the Most Sacred Governing Synod as the ruling authority of the Church. This body consisted of several bishops and was headed by the
Chief Procurator, an appointee of the Czar. The Synod governed until the Kerensky
Revolution in 1917 brought a brief interlude of political freedom, during which the
Patriarchate was re-established as the supreme Church authority. See Saint Nicholas
Cathedral v. Kedroff, 302 N.Y. 1, 5, 96 N.E.2d 56, 57 (1950).
3. Also known as the Reformed Church. It is conceded by all parties to this
action that this group was without any legal or canonical basis to assume the governing authority of the Church. See instant case at 42-3, 114 N.E.2d at 199.
4. "A Sobor is a convention of bishops, clergymen and laymen with superior
powers, with the assistance of which the church officials rule their diocese or districts." Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 96 n.1 (1953). Here the
reference is to a supreme sobor representative of the entire Russian Church.
5. One taking the place of another; a substitute.
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American group. When Sergius died in 1945, a supreme sobor was convened in Moscow, which all parties to this action concede to have been entirely proper and canonical, and a new Patriarch, Alexy, elected.0 Alexy
offered to readmit the American group if it agreed to refrain from political
activities against the U.S.S.R. The American faction rejected the offer
and instituted this suit to regain possession 7 of the Cathedral from Benjamin, the archbishop appointed by the central church.8 The New York
Court of Appeals originally rendered judgment for the American schism
on the basis that the New York religious corporation law 9 by statute
transferred control of the Cathedral from the central church to the separatist
group. 10 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the statute was
declared to be an unconstitutional infringement upon the free exercise of
religion and the case remanded to the state court." On remand, the Court
of Appeals returned the case to the trial court with directions, based on the
common law, that if the trial court finds that the Soviet Government does
in fact so dominate and influence the central church that it is incapable of
freely exercising its authority and properly administering the Cathedral for
the benefit of the Church faithful in America, or that the present central
governing body is not the authentic successor to the last undisputed proper
authority, Patriarch Tikhon, judgment is to be rendered for the appellant
American faction. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox
Church in North America v. Kedroff, 306 N.Y. 38, 114 N.E.2d 197 (1953).
Civil courts have no jurisdiction of disputes between factions of religious organizations concerning purely ecclesiastical matters.'12 Where
6. The American faction was invited to send representatives to this sobor. Delegates were dispatched, but because of travel delays did not reach Moscow until ten
days after the sobor had adjourned. See Saint Nicholas Cathedral v. Kedroff, 302

N.Y. 1, 17, 96 N.E.2d 56, 64-5 (1950).

7. Title to the Cathedral is in the American group. This does not, however,
automatically entitle them to possession. Title to property of religious societies is
generally held in trust by several laymen of the local congregation, while control and
possession depend on the organic law of the organization. See Saint Nicholas
Cathedral v. Kedroff, 302 N.Y. 1, 20, 96 N.E.2d 56, 66 (1950) (in New York this
rule is embodied in a statute).
8. Actually, Benjamin did not come into possession of the Cathedral until shortly
after this action commenced. Possession had been in and the action originally brought
against Kedroff, the son and successor of Kedrovsky, who had been appointed archbishop of the American Diocese by the uncanonical and now extinct Renovated Church.
Kedrovsky was awarded possession in Kedrovsky v. Rojdesvensky, 242 N.Y. 547, 152
N.E. 421 (1926), on the now admittedly mistaken finding that the leaders of the
Renovated Church were the proper successors to Patriarch Tikhon. When this suit
was instituted against Kedroff, he apparently realized that he had no legitimate claim
to possession and surrendered the Cathedral to Benjamin. Benjamin was then allowed
to intervene in the action as an interested party, claiming the right to possession on
the grounds of his appointment as archbishop by the central church. See instant case
at 45, 114 N.E.2d at 201.
9. N.Y. RELIGIOUS CORP. LAws § 5-c.
10. Saint Nicholas Cathedral v. Kedroff, 302 N.Y. 1, 96 N.E.2d 56 (1950);
64 HARv. L. REV. 1360 (1950); 26 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 525 (1951).
11. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1953); 19 BROOK LYN L.
REv. 309 (1953); 22 U. OF CIN. L. REv. 246 (1953).
12. United States ex rel. Johnson v. First Baptist Church, 13 F.2d 296 (D.C.
Cir. 1926) (church governing body expelled member; court held it had no power to
review this action); Connoly v. Smith, 255 Ky. 630, 75 S.W.2d 222 (1934) (court
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property rights are involved in the controversy, however, the courts are
obligated to take jurisdiction."3 The Supreme Court has defined the limits
of intervention in such cases in Watson v. Jones,'4 in which it was held that
where property rights are dependent upon questions of religious doctrine
or discipline in an hierarchical church, the decision of the religious question made by the highest church judicatory to which the matter has been
carried shall be accepted as conclusive by the civil courts in determining
the disposition of the property right. Courts have limited this principle by
refusing to accept as conclusive decisions of church judicatories if the court
found that under church law the judicatory had been improperly convened,' 5
had followed incorrect procedure,' 6 or had exceeded its jurisdiction 17 in
making the decision, or that the decision had been obtained by fraud or
collusion.'
If the property in question bad been left in trust for the
furtherance of a specifically defined purpose, any pronouncement of the
judicatory that the court felt militated against this purpose has been disregarded.' 9 Decisions of church authorities which substantially altered the
original tenets of the organization,2 0 or were generally immoral 21 have
refused to take jurisdiction of church controversy over the adoption of rules concerning the admission of new members); Hynes v. Lilies, 183 Mo. 190, 170 S.W. 396
(1914) (court refused to review excommunication of priest).
13. E.g., Ramsey v. Hicks, 174 Ind. 428, 91 N.E. 344 (1910).
(The supreme
governing body of a hierarchical church voted to unite with another religious organization. Members of a local congregation brought an action to eject from possession of
the congregation's building the appointees of the new unified organization on the
grounds that the governing body had no authority under church law to effect the
union. The court took jurisdiction of the dispute and awarded possession to the
defendants, fining that the governing body did have authority to effect the union.)
See Note, 39 HARV. L. REv. 1079 (1926).
14. 13 Wall. 680 (U.S. 1871).
15. Bonocum v. Murphey, 71 Neb. 463, 98 N.W. 1030 (1904) ; Brisco v. Williams,
192 S.W.2d 643 (Mo. App. 1946); Tuberville v. Morris, 203 S.C. 287, 26 S.E.2d 821
(1943).
16. Longmeyer v. Payne, 205 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. 1947); Kamanski v. Haynack,
373 Pa. 194, 95 A.2d 548 (1953).
17. Monk v. Little, 122 Ark. 7, 183 S.W. 511 (1916) (ecclesiastical body's award
of possession of church to defendants, who had rebelled against pastor's decision on
admission of a member, invalidated on the finding that the body was not authorized
under church law to review decisions of pastor) ; Mason v. Lee, 96 Miss. 186, 50
So. 625 (1909) ; Woodrum v. Burton, 88 W.Va. 322, 107 S.E. 102 (1921) (possession
of church given to faction supporting pastor dismissed by church council on finding
that council had no canonical authority to so dismiss). See First Baptist Church v.
Franklin, 4 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1941); Furmanski v. Iwanowski, 265 Pa. 1, 108 At.
27 (1919).
18. Brundage v. Deardorf, 55 Fed. 839 (6th Cir. 1893); Hatfield v. DeLong,
156 Ind. 207, 39 N.E. 483 (1901), as qualified by Bentile v. Ulay, 175 Ind. 494, 94 N.E.
759 (1911). See Gonzolez v. Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
19. Gonzolez v. Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929). See Bentile v. Ulay, 175 Ind.
494, 94 N.E. 759 (1911).
20. Helm v. Zarecor, 213 Fed. 649 (D. Tenn. 1913); Whipple v. Febsenfeld, 173
Kan. 427, 249 P.2d 427 (1953) ; True Dutch Church v. Iserman, 64 N.J.L. 506, 45
AtI. 771 (Sup. Ct. 1900). See Apostolic Holiness Union v. Knudson, 21 Idaho 589,
123 Pac. 473 (1912); Bentile v. Ulay, 175 Ind. 494, 94 N.E. 759 (1911).
21. Yanthis v. Kemp, 43 Ind. App. 203, 85 N.E. 976 (1908) (court overruled
demurrer to a complaint filed by faction seeking to oust from the possession of the
church the defendants, who would otherwise be entitled to control, on grounds that
the defendants supported a pastor who had been convicted of adultery, bastardy and
other crimes of moral turpitude).
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also been nullified. It has even been held that an entire religious organization may be dissolved for engaging in practices which are repugnant to
22
public policy.
Previously, courts have abridged the doctrine of separation of church
and state, as envisaged in the Constitution 2 3 and enunciated in Watson v.
Jones,24 only when considered necessary to protect the individual members
of a religious organization from acts of the organizational authority contrary to church law or doctrine 25 and to stop activities that strike at the
fundamental morals of society. The instructions of the instant court allow
the trial court to overrule the decisions of the Patriarch on either of two
grounds: failure of succession or governmental domination. If the lower
court finds that in view of Tikhon's ukase and subsequent demise, there
was such a cessation of the church function that the present church in
Russia cannot be considered the same hierarchy, then the American faction
has greater rights to the Cathedral than anyone else. Considering that the
1945 Sobor, which elected the present Patriarch, was anticipated by Tikhon
in his 1920 ukase and is universally conceded to have been proper, such a
finding seems unlikely, 26 but this instruction offers a doctrinal peg that
presents no serious encroachment upon hierarchical autonomy while protecting the individual member and legitimate church authorities from forceful or fraudulent usurpation of the hierarchical power. If, on the other hand,
the only finding can be that the Russian Church is dominated by the Russian
State, that in itself appears to be no change from the conditions under
which the Russian 27 and other 2 8 churches have historically operated, and
points to the conclusion that it is not secular domination per se, but the
politics of the dominating force that is objectionable. Moreover, to permit
court invalidation of an otherwise proper decision, not in itself or accom22. Church of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890) (religious
corporation dissolved for practice of polygamy).
23. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.... ".U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. I; see Note, 13 VA.
L. REv. 400, 401 (1927).

24. Considering that Watson v. Jones was decided before it was held that the
Fourteenth Amendment applied the limitations of the First Amendment to the states,
and that federal jurisdiction of the case depended solely on diversity of citizenship,
it cannot be said that the Court was laying down a constitutional doctrine. It does
appear, however, that the Court did base its decision upon general law applicable to
all states, rather than on the law of the particular state in which the property in question was located. See Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 115 (1953).
25. Courts have also sought to protect the rights of the hierarchical organization.
Thus it has been held that a faction seceding from a religious society cannot take
church property along with it so long as there remains in the society a group of any
size that abides by the doctrine of the united body as professed when the property
was acquired. Karoly v. Hungarian Reformed Church, 83 N.J. Eq. 514, 91 At. 808
(Ch. 1914). Compare First Lutheran Church v. Evangelical Synod, 135 F.2d 701
(10th Cir. 1943).
26. See Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 125 (1953) (concurring
opinion by Frankfurter, J.).

27.. See text at note 2 and note 2 supra.
28. Examples of other hierarchical organizations controlled to a varying degree
by the secular state are the Serbian Orthodox Church (Yugoslavia), 16 ENCYCLoPEDIA BR ITANICA 941-2 (21st ed. 1953) ; Church of Greece, ibid.; Church of England,
5 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 673-4 (21st ed. 1953).

1954]

RECENT CASES

panied by any overt acts in violation of church tenets or social mores, of a
church judicatory on the extremely nebulous grounds that the mental
processes of the judicatory are influenced by an external irreligious force,
creates the hazard of complete judicial subjugation of spiritual organizations. Either of the alternatives faced by the court involves state interference with the church; but a violation of the doctrine of separation of
church and state in the United States would not cure its violation in Russia,
and would create a precedent on grounds in which distinctions are not
easily drawn. Conceding that it is detrimental to the religious liberty of the
individual if the church in which he places his spiritual trust is governed
by an authority subject to irreligious influences, the existence of the danger
noted above makes it advisable to stay the hand of court censure until the
domination results in acts demonstrably contrary to the basic church
tenets 2. or inimical to state security or civil ethics.

Constitutional LawVALIDITY OF FAIR TRADE REAFFIRMED IN
FEDERAL COURTS OVER DUE
PROCESS OBJECTIONS
Plaintiff corporation, manufacturer of an extensive line of pharmaceuticals marketed nationally under its trade-mark, sought to enjoin defendants, who operate two supermarkets in New Orleans, from retailing these
drug products at less than the minimum prices established by contracts
between plaintiff and other retailers in the state in accordance with the
Louisiana Fair Trade Law. 1 Defendants were not parties to any such
contract, but conceded that they had violated the "nonsigner" provision
of the statute 2 by wilfully and knowingly advertising and selling these
products at less than the minimum prices stipulated in plaintiff's contracts
with other retailers. Defendants based their defense solely on the alleged
29. E.g., in the instant case the court could properly award possession of the
Cathedral to the American faction if it were clearly established that the appointees
of the central church were preaching communistic atheism from the pulpits of the
local churches. See note 20 supra.
1. "No contract relating to the sale or resale of a commodity which bears, or
the label or container of which bears, the trade-mark, brand, or name of the producer
of the commodity and which is in fair and open competition with commodities of the
same general class produced by others, shall violate any law of this state by reason
of any of the following provisions which may be contained in the contract: (1) That
the vendee shall not resell the commodity at less than the minimum price stipulated
by the vendor; (2) That the vendee or producer require in delivery to whom he may
resell the commodity, an agreement that the second vendee will not, in turn, resell
at less than the minimum price stipulated by the vendor or by the vendee." LA. Rzv.
STAT. tit. 51, §392 (1950).
2. "Wilfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling any commodity at less than the minimum price stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant to the provisions of R.S. 51:392, whether the person so advertising, offeiing
for sale or selling is or is not a party to the contract, is unfair competition and is
actionable by any person damaged." LA. Rzv. STAT. tit. 51, § 394 (1950).
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unconstitutionality of the Louisiana statute, and of the Federal McGuire
Act 3 which amended the Federal Trade Commission Act to exclude the
enforcement of state-authorized fair trade contracts against nonsigners, as
well as against signers, from the ban of the anti-trust laws. The circuit
court affirmed the granting of an injunction by the district court,4 holding
that neither the state nor federal act, nor both together, violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as lacking substantial relation to the public welfare or as attempting an unlawful delegation of a
legislative function to private persons. 5 Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super
Markets v. Eli Lilly & Co., 205 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1953) (Holmes, J.
dissenting), cert. denied, 22 U.S.L. WEEK 3104 (U.S. Oct. 20, 1953). 6
The fair trade movement rose to prominence in the early 1930's in
response to the meagre consumer purchasing power of the depression years
and the resultant increased inroads on the sales volume of old-style retailers
by chain stores, supermarkets, and other enterprises which featured substantial price reductions as a substitute for the more extensive services
traditionally offered.7 The California Fair Trade Act of 1931, s as amended
in 1933, 9 served as the pattern for a rapid harvest of basically similar stat3. The provision applicable to nonsigners reads as follows: "Nothing contained
in this section or in any of the Antitrust Acts shall render unlawful the exercise or
the enforcement of any right or right of action created by any statute, law, or public
policy now or hereafter in effect in any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia,
which in substance provides that wilfully and knowingly advertising, offering for
sale, or selling any commodity at less than the price or prices prescribed in such
contracts or agreements whether the person so advertising, offering for sale, or selling
is or is not a party to such a contract or agreement, is unfair competition and is
actionable at the suit of any person damaged thereby." 38 STAT. 719 (1914), as
amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §45(a) (3) (Supp. 1952).
4. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets, 109 F. Supp. 269
(E.D. La. 1953).
5. A further argument, that the federal statute effected an unconstitutional delegation by Congress to the states of the federal power to regulate interstate commerce,
was rejected on the authority of Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408
(1946).
6. The Supreme Court likewise declined to review Grayson-Robinson Stores,
Inc. v. Oneida, Ltd., 209 Ga. 613, 75 S.E.2d 161 (1953), cert. denied, 22 U.S.L. WEEK
3090 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1953), which held Georgia's fair trade act to be in violation of
the due process clause of the Georgia Constitution. In other recent cases, the fair
trade act of the State of New York, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 369-a et seq., was upheld
along with the McGuire Act in General Electric Co. v. S. Klein-On-The-Square, Inc.,
121 N.Y.S.2d 37 (1953), while the Superior Court of New Jersey declared the McGuire Act invalid as applied to nonsigners, Lionel Corp. v. Grayson-Robinson Stores,
Inc., 98 A.2d 623 (N.J. 1953). See note 18, infra.
7. GRETHER, PRICE CONTROL UNDER FAIR TRADE LEGISLATION 8, 9 (1939);
ZORN AND FELDMAN, BusINEss UNDER THE NEW PRICE LAWS 26 (1937); Comment,

For comprehensive review and evaluation of the
61 YALE L.J. 381, 403 (1952).
development of fair trade, see FTC, REPORT ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE (1945) ;
GRETHER, op. cit. supra at 14-46; THE NATIONAL WHOLESALE DRUGGISTS' AssocIATION, THE BASIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF FAIR TRADE (1950); Schachtman, Resale
Price Maintenance and The Fair Trade Laws, 11 U. OF PITT. L. REv. 562 (1950) ;
Comments, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 781 (1951); 61 YALE L.J. 381 (1952); H.R. REP. No.
1292, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952); and bibliography in OPPENHEIM, UNFAIR TRADE
PRACTICES 887-8 (1950).
8. CAL. STATS. 1931, c. 278, §§ 1 et seq.
9. CAL. STATS. 1933, c. 260, §§ 1 et seq.
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utes which now are in effect in 43 states. 10 A vigorous spur to this development was the decision of the Supreme Court in Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp.,"' which upheld the constitutionality of the Illinois statute against charges that its enforcement against
nonsigners arbitrarily denied due process of law and constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative power. The Miller-Tydings Amendment of
193712 seemingly hurdled the obstacle of an earlier Supreme Court case,13
which had interpreted the Sherman Act 14 as banning resale price agreements when interstate commerce was involved, by exempting contracts or
agreements prescribing minimum resale prices for trade-marked commodities in competition with goods of other producers, when contracts of
that description were lawful in the state of resale. More recently, the
effective scope of this exemption was closely circumscribed. In Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,"5 the Supreme Court interpreted
the amendment as intended to immunize from the Sherman Act only the
making and enforcement of voluntary agreements, not the extension of
their requirements to nonassenting dealers. The legislative story is brought
to date with the McGuire Act,' enacted by Congress expressly to reverse
the result of Schwegnmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp. and to render
lawful the nonsigner clause found in every state statute, and which fair
trade adherents insist is necessary to the practical effectiveness of these
17
laws.
10. Advocates of resale price maintenance shifted their attention to state legislatures when efforts to prompt action by Congress proved unsuccessful. The legality
of resale price agreements in Vermont still is moot in the absence of a statute or
adjudications on the point. In Georgia, Missouri, Texas, and the District of Columbia
such agreements are illegal; see 2 CCH TRADE REG. SERVICE (9th ed.) ff 7011 for a
descriptive table. The Michigan Fair Trade Act was declared unconstitutional as
applied to nonsigners in Shakespeare Company v. Lippman's Tool Shop Sporting

Goods Co., 334 Mich. 109, 54 N.W.2d 268 (1952).
11. 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
12. 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1946).
13. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
14. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2
(1946).

341 U.S. 384 (1951).
See note 3 supra.
This contention is supported by experience with the original California
which proved ineffective until a nonsigner provision was added in 1933.
See note 9 supra; Grether, Experience in California with Fair Trade Legislation
Restricting Price Cutting, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 640, 644 (1936). An effective sanction
must be available to prevent nonassenters from draining off business from their
15.
16.
17.
statute,

price-supporting competitors by featuring price reductions on popular items.

Since

fair trade contracts customarily require the first vendee to demand from a subsequent vendee an agreement to maintain the contract price (see note 1 supra, clause (2)
of the Louisiana statute), an alternate mode of enforcement seems at first glance
to be available in the guise of a suit for tortious interference with contractual relations to be brought against any nonsigner who induces a contracting dealer to supply
him. A trade-mark owner obtained injunctive relief against such interference in
Sunbeam Corp. v. Payless Drug Stores, 113 F. Supp. 31 (N.D. Cal. 1953).

However,

in contrast to the clear-cut statutory cause of action provided by the nonsigner clause,
this alternate method might involve difficulties of proof in ascertaining which dealer
was the source of the price-cutter's merchandise, and then the right to bring the
action presumably would be limited to the vendor of the particular dealer who
breached his contract. In short, some expeditious means of control over nonparticipants is essential for a successful fair trade program, and the nonsigner clause,

if not the only feasible device, is certainly the most effective.
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In the instant case, the circuit court invoked the clear authority of
Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp. to reject de8
fendants' argument that application of the Louisiana Fair Trade Law 1 to
nonsigners violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.?9
The only substantial basis for challenge to the continued vitality of Old
Dearbornas controlling precedent lies in defendants' assertion that experience with fair trade activity during the intervening years has demonstrated
the unrealistic quality of the underlying theory of that case: that fair trade
is a measure directed primarily at protection of producers' interest in the
property value represented by their trade-marks. The price restriction
was there termed not an end in itself, but only a means of protecting this
property interest.20 This rationale has been widely discredited in recognition of evidence that virile sponsorship of fair trade stems principally from
vocal distributor organizations seeking sanctuary from price competition,
and that relatively few trade-mark owners are doing more than acceding
to the wishes of their distributors when they lend support. 2 1 On the other
hand, there are some indications of support by manufacturers prompted by
genuine interests of their own. 2 It is of crucial importance whether the

18. Due process objections should be addressed initially to the state fair trade
acts themselves, not to the McGuire Act, which is in fact only enabling legislation
effecting the repeal of a portion of the anti-trust prohibitions. However, a contrary
conclusion was reached in Lionel Corp. v. Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., supra note
6, by the New Jersey Superior Court, which voided the federal statute, apparently
on due process grounds, while assuming the continuing constitutionality of the state
law.
19. Defendants countered with the claim that the decision and tenor of the
opinion in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp. evidenced a reversal by the
Supreme Court of its earlier view on the constitutionality of fair trade. The circuit
court dismissed this contention, pointing out that the question of statutory interpretation which formed the sole context of the first Schwegtnann case could provide
no basis for anything more than conjecture as to the Court's attitude with reference
to the constitutionality of nonsigner provisions. See text at note 15 and note 15
s tpra.
20. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183,
193 (1936).
21. The district court which granted plaintiff an injunction in the instant case
stated that, "Actually the retail dealer associations rather than the manufacturers
have been the outstanding protagonists of fair trade legislation before the Congress
and the state legislatures. As a matter of fact, the affidavits filed by the plaintiff
herein suggest the possibility that the manufacturers may be the unwilling proponents
of such measures." Eli Lilly & Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets,
109 F. Supp. 269, 270 note 7 (E.D. La. 1953). See COVER, ET AL., PROBLEMS OF SMALL
BUSIXESS 189, 190 (TNEC Monograph 17, 1940); FTC, op. cit. supra note 7, at
LIV; H.R. REP. No. 1292, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1952). Actual coercion or threats
of boycott directed at manufacturers are not the only circumstances which would discredit the theory of Old Dearborn. It would be enough to show that most manufacturers who initiate fair trade do so because they know it is desired by their distributors and is the only way of preventing the favoring of products of other manufacturers who provide this benefit, and' that they do not participate to serve any
unique interest of their own. besides averting retailer disaffection.
22. See full page advertisement by a manufacturer, Doeskin Products, Inc., after
denial of certiorari in the instant case, heralding the continuance of fair trade as a
boon to manufacturer, retailer, and consumer alike. N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1953, § C,
p. 44. See also testimony as to beneficial effects of fair trade on their business by
the following manufacturers, among others, in Hearings before a Subcommittee of
the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Comwrce on H.R. 5767, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess. 94 (Eli Lilly & Co.), 136 (Johnson & Johnson, Inc.), 143 (Sunbeam Corp.),
165 (Coty, Inc.) (1952). The Bureau of Education on Fair Trade introduced a statement that, "The supporters of fair trade include thousands of manufacturers, many
of them small . . . ." Id. at 9.
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establishing by contract of prices, which the statute then makes binding
on nonsigners, is, because of retailer influence, essentially an indirect, carefully veiled exercise by them of legislatively granted regulatory power, or
is instead merely what it appears superficially to be: the assertion of
proprietary rights by producers placing goods on the market. The constitutional objections urged against the fair trade statute-that it is an
unreasonable regulation of the defendants' business, and an unlawful delegation of legislative power-are dependent upon a preliminary determination
that there is in fact "regulation," and not simply an exercise of property
rights as alleged by fair trade sponsors.3 If a showing can be made that
nonsigners actually are being coerced primarily, though indirectly, by
fellow retailers desirous of restraining price competition, the fair trade
statute assumes the character of a patently regulatory measure, with the
regulation emanating for the most part from parties having no antecedent
property rights in the merchandise purchased and resold by nonassenters.
Consideration can then be given to the often expressed argument that, even
assuming the need for some degree of regulation of price-cutting, the restrictions imposed upon defendants' retail operations by the nonsigner
clause are unreasonably severe, and, far from furthering the general welfare, are economically undesirable. 24 These critics insist that nothing more
is needed to curb those predatory practices which may prevail than increased emphasis on Unfair Practices Acts, a less extreme type of legislation in force in over half the states. 25 However, this economic issue is at
least sufficiently debatable to render highly unlikely judicial reversal of
23. If the latter is accepted as true, objections on constitutional grounds are
neatly obviated. Since a retailer would seem to have no constitutional right to be
supplied with a given commodity by its producer or a wholesaler, there is no constitutional bar to the establishing of stringent price restrictions by the owner as a
condition to the passing of title.
24. See COVER Er AL., op. cit. supra note 21, at 193, 202-03; FTC, op. cit. supra
note 7, at LIV, LX; RahI, Resale Price Maintenance, State Action, and the Antitrust Laws, 46 ILL. L. REV. 349, 369 (1951) ; Schachtman, supra note 7, at 589-590;
Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 381, 403 (1952).
25. The legislation recommended is variously described in the states as Unfair
Practices Acts, Sales Below Cost Acts, etc. (A list of these acts, with references
to location of their texts in the CCH volume, may be found in 2 CCH TRADE REG.
SERVICE (9th ed.) ff 7503). Illustrative of the more comprehensive type is the California Unfair Practices Act of 1941, CAL. Bus. AND PROF. CODE §§ 17000-17101
(1944), which subjects to civil liability and penal sanctions certain sales practices,
if conducted with intent to destroy competition of other dealers. A seller may not
create unjustifiable locality discriminations, sell at less than cost, give special discounts to certain purchasers, or sell any product as a loss leader, i.e., at less than
cost so as to induce the purchase of other merchandise or divert trade from competitors. Proof of sale below cost and an injurious effect on a competitor is made
presumptive evidence of the intent to injure competitors. It would seem that modifications of this statute, as perhaps to forbid sales not only at below cost, but also at
below cost plus a certain required markup depending on the class of product, would
provide all legitimate protection for trademark owners, without impeding the passing
on to consumers of savings from efficient distributive methods of dealers such as the
instant defendants, who, it was established, ".

.

. had a uniform markup, employed

no loss leaders, and indulged in no otherwise predatory practices." Instant case at
790. Likewise avoided would be the monopolistic potentialities of fair trade, often
condemned by the FTC and the Department of Justice. See Hearings before the
Antitrust Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 4365, HR.. 4592,
H.R. 4662, H.R. 6367, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1952).

414

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102

the legislative judgment of the states by a decigion that the operation of the
statute is so unreasonable and arbitrary as to violate the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 6 As to the other alleged unconstitutional
feature of the statute, if organized retailers do impose a form of regulation
upon the price policies of the dissentients in their ranks by influencing
manufacturers to collaborate with them in utilizing the fair trade statutes,
then that regulation is not subject to the restraint of any limiting standard
27
Relatively
which would preserve the constitutionality of the legislation.
uncharted as is the law on delegation of power to private persons, the
total absence of any standard to restrict the price-fixing power would seem
to justify the conclusion of unconstitutionality, if the assumed premise of
28
retailer domination is correct.
However, satisfactory demonstration of this premise in court is likely
to be exceedingly difficult. Proof of positive threats of boycott or other
retaliation by distributor groups is not a telling argument against the constitutionality of fair trade statutes, since the statutes themselves do not
legalize coercion of manufacturers. 29 It would indicate, rather, an inadequacy of law enforcement, for, at least where interstate commerce is
0
On the
involved, action of that nature is subject to criminal prosecution.
other hand, proof that existence of fair trade statutes fosters an atmosphere
of more subtle pressure on producers, 8 ' which is beyond the capability of
enforcement officials to police, seems unavailable in terms of sufficient con26. See CoRwiN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 173-77 (6th
ed. 1938) ; DYKSTRA, A TEXTBOOK ON GOVERNMfENT AND BUSINESS 178 (1939).
27. No standard is necessary for validity when the established price is thought
of as determined by the owner of the product and based solely upon his own plans
and policies, supra note 23. However, a different view was expressed, and the charge
of improper delegation sustained even though the source of the control was deemed to
be producers, in the voiding of the predecessor of the current Florida statute, Liquor
Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So.2d 371, 375 (Fla. 1949). Similar
views were expressed in vigorous dissenting opinions in Max Factor & Co. v. Kuns-

man, 5 Cal.2d 446, 477, 55 P.2d 177, 192 (1936) and Ely Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216
N.C. 163, 186, 4 S.E.2d 528, 544 (1939).

Amendment of the laws to include a sufficient standard of "reasonableness" of
price, or the like, probably would bring them close to the pattern of the "Unfair
Practices Acts," supra note 25, which are currently deemed unsatisfactory by fair
trade supporters.
28. Accord, Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116
(1928) ; Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912) ; cf. Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). But
cf. Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917).
29. Even noncoercive agreements, on what is commonly termed the "horizontal"
level, are not legalized by fair trade statutes. The following provision is typical of
those found in the laws of the various states:
"This Sub-part [the Fair Trade Law] shall not apply to any contract between
producers, or between wholesalers, or between retailers as to sale or resale prices."
LA. REV. STAT. tit. 51, § 395 (1950).
30. Convictions under the Sherman Act were sustained in United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945).
31. More specifically, a realization by producers that, though they themselves may
not anticipate any substantial independent advantage, it may be advisable or necessary
to adopt a fair trade program in order to prevent distributors from slighting their
products in favor of those of other manufacturers who provide fair trade protection.
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crete evidence to sway a judicial decision.3 2 Thus, the argument pointing
to possible unconstitutionality of the nonsigner clause, is likely never to
acquire its keystone, proof of "regulation." But the most regrettable aspect
of the instant case is the failure of the Supreme Court to avail itself of the
opportunity presented by this carefully framed test litigation to reconsider
these puzzling questions and resolve them in terms of current economic
realities.

Federal JurisdictionAMENABILITY OF FOREIGN CORPORATION TO

SERVICE DETERMINED BY STATE TESTS
IN DIVERSITY CASE
Defendant, a Kentucky corporation, occasionally sold metal products
in Pennsylvania through commission agents.1 Plaintiff, a citizen of Pennsylvania, brought a libel action in a federal district court of that state
alleging that the defendant had sent a defamatory letter to a recipient in
Pennsylvania and grounding his claim of federal jurisdiction upon diversity
of citizenship. The district court dismissed the action on the ground that
the defendant was not doing business in Pennsylvania 2 and was, therefore,
not subject to service in that jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed,
stating that when this question is presented in diversity cases the court must
first determine whether the foreign corporation would be subject to service
under the applicable state statutes and decisions; if so, the second inquiry
is whether the state interpretation of "doing business" is permitted by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court then held
that the dismissal was proper, since the defendant was not doing business
in Pennsylvania within the meaning of the Pennsylvania statute as construed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Partinv. MichaelsArt Bronze
Co., 202 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1953).
When the Supreme Court, in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,3 overruled its
prior decision that federal courts sitting in diversity cases need apply the
32. Manufacturers who support fair trade enthusiastically of their own accord
will, of course, offer voluminous testimony to controvert the charge that it is sponsored by retailers for their benefit. Those manufacturers who participate only because of fear of retaliation, or as a positive mode of cementing friendly relations with
distributors, will, for the identical reasons, be reluctant to incur disfavor by testifying
adversely to fair trade interests.
1. These agents were not controlled by the defendant, received no salary, and
could not bind the corporation to contracts. Skilled technicians were sent from
Kentucky to install some of the products sold in Pennsylvania.
2. "Before a state may compel a corporation of another state to submit to its
jurisdiction in any aspect, it must be within the state in some form." Commonwealth
ex rel. Baldridge v. Sun Oil Co., 294 Pa. 99, 105, 143 Atl. 495, 497 (1928). Most
states have statutes which declare that foreign corporations which are "doing business"
within the state are subject to its jurisdiction. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3142
(Purdon 1938).
3. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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law of the forum-state only insofar as it was expressed by statute, 4 it stated
that state court decisions would thereafter control in matters of "substantive law." Subsequent cases have rephrased the substantive-procedural
test into the formulation that state law must be applied whenever doing
otherwise would lead to a "different result" in the outcome of the case.5
This "result" test has been applied to determinations of diversity jurisdiction: where, as a matter of local policy, a party is barred from suit on a
state-created right in the state court, he is likewise barred from asserting
that right in the federal court of that state. 6 Accordingly, in diversity cases
involving a foreign corporation, a number of federal courts have reasoned
that the first question is whether the state court, under state law, would
have jurisdiction. 7 Only if this should be answered affirmatively, is the
question of the constitutionality of that jurisdiction decided.8 In the past,
most states had extended their jurisdiction to the constitutional limit.9
However, recent decisions of the Supreme Court,'0 which greatly extend
the reach of the state courts over foreign corporations," have somewhat
shifted the focus of district court inquiry in diversity cases.' 2 Emphasis
has changed from what is permitted by the Constitution 13 to what has been
attempted by the states, i.e., have the state courts exercised jurisdiction
over corporations engaged in similar activity. 1 4 This two-step analysis of
4. Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (U.S. 1842).
5. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). See Merrigan, Erie to York
to Ragan-A Triple Play on the Federal Rides, 3 VAND. L. REv. 711, 716 (1950).
6. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949); Angel v. Bullington,
330 U.S. 183 (1947).
7. E.g., Bomze v. Nardis Sportswear, 165 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1948). This question
was decided adversely to the plaintiff in the instant case. The additional point that
the alleged cause of action did not arise out of the business done in the state, Woodworkers Tool Works v. Byrne, 191 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1951), was indicated by the
majority in the instant case to be a Pennsylvania requirement for jurisdiction, citing,
GOODRIcH-AmRAm, STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE §§2077(a)-21, 2077(a)-22
(1940).
Instant case at 544, n.4.
8. Bomze v. Nardis Sportswear, supra note 7; Green v. Equitable Powder Mfg.
Co., 99 F. Supp. 237 (W.D. Ark. 1951). Cf. McKnett V. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292
U.S. 230, 233 (1934).
9. See Bomze v. Nardis Sportswear, supra note 7, at 35.
10. Perkins v. Benguet Cons. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) ; Travelers Health
Ass'n. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950) ; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945).
11. Insurance Co. of N. America v. Lone Star Package Car Co., 107 F. Supp.
645, 650 (S.D. Texas 1952).
12. When federal jurisdiction is based upon the jurisdiction statute of a federal
district, Goldberg v. Southern Builders, 184 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1950), territory,
Leakley v. Canadian Pacific Express Co., 82 F. Supp. 906 (D. Alaska 1949), or possession, Carmack v. Panama Coca Cola Bottling Co., 190 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1951),
no local test need be applied.
13. People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 (1918); Cf.
Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907).
14. American Universal Ins. Co. v. Sterling, 203 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1953);
De Santa v. Nehi Corp., 171 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1948); Allentown Record Co. v.
Agrashell, 101 F. Supp. 790 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
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the state court interpretation and federal constitutional definition of doing
business is now utilized by the majority of the circuits, 15 although there is
scattered authority to the contrary.'
The concurring opinion of Chief Judge Biggs in the instant case
states that since the Federal Constitution grants jurisdiction to federal
courts in diversity cases, 17 it is not constitutionally within the power of the
states to limit this grant,1s such power being vested in Congress."D But
Congress has exercised the power given to it by Article III to implement
the grant of jurisdiction to the courts through the Federal judiciary Act
of 1789.2o The Supreme Court has, in effect, interpreted the "rules of
decision" clause of this Act 21 to include state determinations of jurisdiction
over some suits by foreign corporations.2 It has thus been reasoned that
the jurisdiction of federal courts in diversity cases is set by this interpretation of the Act of 1789, by which Congress may be said to have adopted the
state definitions of "doing business." 2
15. Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1948); Kelley
v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 170 F.2d 195 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 939
(1949); Bomze v. Nardis Sportswear, 165 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1948); Rosenthal v.

Frankfort Distillers Corp., 193 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1951); Canvas Fabricators v.
William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 199 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1952); Roark v. American
Distilling Co., 97 F.2d 297 (8th Cir. 1938) (This decision was based upon Kansas
City Structural Steel Co. v. Arkansas, 269 U.S. 148 (1925), which accepted "the
decision of the Supreme Court of Arkansas as to what constitutes the doing of business in that State within the meaning of its own laws." 269 U.S. at 150) ; Steinway
v. Majestic Amusement Co., 179 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1949), 18 A.L.R.2d 179, cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 947 (1950). But cf. French v. Gibbs Corp., 189 F.2d 787 (2d Cir.
1951). In the ninth circuit, Perkins v. Louisville & N.R.R., 94 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.
Cal. 1951) treats the problem as one of substantive law, but refers to both California
and federal court decisions. Final decision was based upon state law. Cf. Dam v.
General Electric Co., 111 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Wash. 1953).
16. Recently, a district court in the third circuit did not apply the doctrine and
distinguished many of the cases cited herein. The determination that the corporation was doing business within the state was made on the basis of federal decisions,
but the court added that the same result would have been reached under state decisions. Ackerly v. Commercial Credit Co., 111 F. Supp. 92, 97-102 (D.N.J. 1953).
To the same effect is Pike v. New England Greyhound Lines, 93 F. Supp. 669 (D.
Mass. 1950).
17. U.S. CoNsT. Art. III, § 2.
18. "Whether a foreign corporation . . . is doing business in a state is a matter
of general, not local, law." 2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE f 4.25, at 969 (2d ed. 1948) ;
Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898) ; Griffith v. Bank of New York,
147 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1945); Davis v. Ensign-Bickford Co., 139 F.2d 624 (8th Cir.
1944). (The jurisdiction of federal courts is not controlled by state law, but depends
upon acts of Congress.). Compare 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 179 (1950).
19. U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 1.
20. 1 STAT. 73 (1789), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1-2680 (Supp. 1952).
21. "The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties
of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in
cases where they apply." 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (Supp. 1952).
22. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., supra note 6, (in which the Supreme Court
reiterated its holding in Angel v. Bullington, supra note 6, that state law determined
jurisdiction in diversity cases, by overruling a court of appeals determination in Interstate Realty Co. v. Woods, 170 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1948), that the Angel holding was
merely argumentative).
23. Trust Co. of Chicago v. Pennsylvania R.R., 183 F.2d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 1950).
Congress may constitutionally adopt state laws. Cooley v. Board of Wardens of
Port of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299 (U.S. 1852).
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By this rationale, the area of the instant case-validity of service of
process upon foreign corporations-has been brought within the traditional Erie doctrine as substantive law. As a matter of first impression,
few would suggest that validity of service of process is substantive rather
than procedural. Yet this is the effect of the decision, and the authority
which it follows.24 Considerable concern has been expressed that the
present line of demarcation between the area of state and federal cognizance
drawn by the Supreme Court has created confusion and uncertainty even
25
as to the scope of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in diversity cases.
This uncertainty is a product of the basic vagueness of the Erie decision
which originally made it necessary to draw the substance-procedure line,
and the currently popular "result" test, which has somewhat changed the
26
Varying
line to include matters within the purview of some of the rules.
solutions have been proposed: making procedure as well as substance conform to state law in diversity cases; 27 reversal of the Erie decision by
statute or judicial decision; 28 or a return to the traditional distinctions
between substance and procedure, 29 except where the public policy of the
forum or practical considerations require otherwise.3 0 Possibly, such
measures could be avoided in the area under consideration here if Congress
could 31 and would provide a uniform formula by which the determination
of "doing business" might be decided.3 2 But legislative inertia might make
it difficult to obtain any action by Congress. Perhaps the Supreme Court
itself could set out such a formula on the ground that Erie does not extend
this far since the determination of validity of service does not determine
the right of the plaintiff to recover, but merely governs the locus of this
24. Cases cited note 15 supra.
25. Gavit, States' Rights and Federal Procedure, 25 IND. L.J. 1 (1949); Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-A Triple Play on the Federal Rules, 3 VAND. L. REv.
711 (1950).
26. E.g., Rules 3 and 15(c), so far as they pertain to state statutes of limitations; Rules 13(a) and 41(a), so far as they determine the effect of a judgment as
res judicata; Rules 17(b) and 23(b), so far as they affect capacity or standing to
sue; and Rule 4 so far as it might permit service by means not sanctioned by state
law. See Notes, 62 HARv. L. REv. 1030 (1949); 38 GEo. L.J. 115 (1949), note
25 supra.
27. Merrigan, supra note 25.
28. Keeffe, Gilhooley, Bailey and Day, Weary Erie, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 494 (1949).
29. Gavit, supra note 25.
30. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie
v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946).
31. Mr. Justice Brandeis stated that the decision in the Erie case was required
on constitutional grounds, 304 U.S. at 77-80; Bowman, The Unconstitutionality of the
Rule of Swift v. Tyson, 18 B.U.L. REV. 659 (1938). This view has not been accepted by the commentators, Keeffe, etc., supra note 28. See also the suggestion in
Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts,
13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 529-30 (1928).

32. District courts would still inquire into the validity of service under state law
in diversity cases in which service was made prior to removal to the federal court
and cases in which service was made under state law pursuant to Rule 4(d) (7).
See Ackerley v. Commercial Credit Co., supra note 16.
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determination.s Adopting this approach, the Supreme Court would be
faced with two alternatives: utilization of state law in default of Congressional action, 34 or adoption of a federal rule by judicial decision. 35 In
any case, from the point of view of both business certainty and logical
symmetry in federal courts, a formula is desirable which would be uniform
without either extensively affecting the conformity of decisions within the
states3 6 or defeating the desire to limit diversity jurisdiction 3T and attendant forum shopping as which led to the Eric decision.

TrademarksPROTECTION AGAINST TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
AFTER EXPIRATION OF DRUG PATENT GIVEN
BY PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Plaintiff, an "ethical" 1 drug house, coined and registered "Dexedrine"
as the trademark for its patented drug dextro-amphetamine sulphate, widely
advertising both trademark and drug to pharmacists and physicians. On
expiration of the patent, defendant began to sell the same drug as "Heart
Brand Dexedrine," and plaintiff sued to enjoin its use of the trademark.
The district court granted a preliminary injunction despite defendant's
contention that the trademark had become the generic name of the drug, and
the circuit court affirmed, holding that the district court had not abused its
33. By this rationale, the conclusion of the instant case may not be required by
the "result" test in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra note 5. This test may be
limited in diversity cases to statutes such as the one involved in Angel v. Bullington,
supra note 6, which withdrew jurisdiction from the state courts in suits for deficiency
judgments without affecting the "substantive law." Bullington v. Angel, 220 N.C. 18,
20, 16 S.E.2d 411, 412 (1941). This effect is criticized in the dissenting opinions of
Justices Reed and Rutledge in Angel, supra note 6, Justice Jackson's dissent in
Woods, supra note 6, and Justice Rutledge's dissent in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial

Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 557 (1949).

34. See Holmburg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946), in which a state statute of
limitations was utilized in an action based on a federal statute, in default of a federally
determined limitation period.
35. Several federal rules might be adapted to this area: judicial decisions interpreting the venue provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (Supp. 1952), e.g., Employers'
Liability Assur. Corp. v. Lejeune, 189 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, sub nor.
Lejeune v. Excess Ins. Co., 342 U.S. 869 (1951), French v. Gibbs Corp, supra note 15;
the nationwide service of process in interpleader established by 28 U.S.C. § 1397
(1946); or even the due process limitation on state action, as in the cases cited in
note 10, supra.
36. King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 333 U.S. 153
(1948).
37. "The only policy consideration which is apparent is that we should not be
astute to widen federal diversity jurisdiction." Goodrich, J., in McCoy v. Siler, 205
F.2d 498, 501 (3d Cir. 1953). See Note, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 420 (1950).
38. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra note 5.
1. An "ethical" drug house is one which confines its advertising to physicians and
druggists, and does not advertise direct to the public. See DICTIONARY OF MARIETING
TERms, UNITED STATES USAGE 37 (Int'l Chamber of Commerce ed. 1952) ; Klemtuer,
How an Ethical Agency Operates, 45 ADVERTISING AGENCY 81 (July 1952).
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discretion.2 The court stated that since dextro-amphetamine sulphate is a
prescription drug, it was irrelevant whether the public was aware that
"Dexedrine" denominated only plaintiff's brand as distinguished from the
product itself.3 Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith Kline & French Laboratories, 207 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1953).
The name under which a patented product is marketed may become
generic and incapable of being exclusively appropriated as a trademark
after expiration of the patent. This has been held to occur if it can be
proved as a question of fact that the name was so identified with the product that in the mind of the buyer it described the product itself instead of
denoting only the brand of the manufacturer.4 The purpose of the rule is
to prevent the perpetuation of the patent monopoly that would result should
competitors not have the right to use the only name which effectively
designates the product to the buyer.5 Thus in Bayer Co. v. United Drug
6
Co.,
where plaintiff sought to enjoin the use of its trademark "Aspirin"
in sales of the patent-expired compound acetyl salicylic acid, the court examined the understanding of both druggists and consumers. The 'evidence
showed that due to Bayer's advertising to druggists "Aspirin" indicated
to them only Bayer's brand of acetyl salicylic acid, whereas the public in
buying over the counter considered it to be the name of a drug. The court
therefore gave the plaintiff only partial protection by ordering that in sales
to druggists of cartons containing bottles of the drug, only the plaintiff
could label the cartons as "Aspirin." The bottles themselves, being destined
to be sold to the public, could be labeled "Aspirin" by all competitors.
However, some cases have held as a matter of law that since the trademark
had been used as the name of a monopolized product, it must have become
2. The court held that a preliminary injunction could be granted upon evidence
adduced solely by affidavits. Instant case at 198. This holding is in conflict with the
practice of the Third Circuit. See Sims v. Greene, 161 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1947).
3. Instant case at 195. Although this statement is not a holding, the use of the
word "irrelevant" will induce reliance by counsel when the case is tried on the merits,
since they will make no effort to introduce evidence as to the knowledge of consumers.
It therefore can be considered a binding declaration of the law in the Ninth Circuit.
4. 1 NIms, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TR DEMARKS 578 (4th ed. 1947); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 735 (1938) ; Handler and Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade NamesAn Analysis and Synthesis, 30 CoL. L. REv. 168, 187 (1930). The problem here is
different from that involved in the doctrine of "secondary meaning,'' which in this context relates to words which were never capable of being appropriated as technical
trademarks (for example, because they are descriptive of the product or are geographical designations). Under the latter doctrine the word is nevertheless granted
a qualified protection if it can be proved that over the years consumers have come to
associate it with a particular, though anonymous, manufacturer. In order to guard the
good will of the manufacturer against fraud and confusion, competitors are required
to accompany their use of the word with some distinguishing feature which indicates
the true source. See Elgin National Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S.
665, 674 (1901). See 1 Nims, op. cit. supra at 154; Note, 150 A.L.R. 1067, 107980 (1944). Where, as in the instant case, the word is fanciful and arbitrary and
therefore a technical trademark, competitors cannot use it at all unless it becomes
generic. In many cases, however, the trademark on a patented product may become
generic and at the same time retain a secondary meaning which entitles it to qualified
protection. E.g., Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
5. 1 Ni as, op. cit. supra note 4, at 574.
6. 272 Fed. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (Learned Hand, J.).
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generic during the life of the patent, and the right to exclusive use of it
must therefore be surrendered upon expiration of the patent. Although
the distinction is ordinarily not articulated, these cases are distinguishable
from those treating the problem as one of fact, because at the time the
patent expired there was no other word which a competitor could use to
reach the market. Thus in the British case of Linoleum Mfg. Co. v. Nairn 7
neither the general term "floor covering" which does not adequately describe the product, nor the technical term "oxidized oil" which had had no
association with the product, could convey to consumers the knowledge that
except in name the competitor's product was no different from the particular one which they had come to know as "Linoleum" during the life of
the patent. Under those circumstances, competition being obviously impossible, determination as a matter of law is justifiable. Where, however,
as in Bayer, competitors would have available a completely descriptive term
which had been associated with the product, 8 they should not be allowed
to use the trademark unless it can be affirmatively proved that buyers had
become so familiar with the trademark that use of the alternate word would
be ineffective; 9 refusal, as a matter of law, of protection imposes too severe
a penalty upon the manufacturer for building up the good will of his trademark.' 0
The dichotomy between druggists and consumers which was established in Bayer, and applied for the first time by a federal circuit court in
the instant case,' I is a natural extension of the doctrine of factual deter7. American cases can be reconciled on a similar basis. In Singer Mfg. Co. v.
June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896), a competitor would have only the general term
sewing machine," of which there were then several models, or the technical term
"lock-stitch sewing machine with curved eye-pointed needle and under-thread shuttle."
20 ENcyc. BRITANNcA 407 (1953). See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S.
111, 117-8 (1938) ; Amiesite Asphalt Co. of America v. Interstate Amiesite Co., 72
F.2d 946, 948-9 (3d Cir. 1934) ; Centaur Co. v. Heinsfurter, 84 Fed. 955, 959 (8th Cir.
1898). But see Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. Ford, 203 Fed. 707 (3d Cir. 1913). See
Holzapfel's Compositions Co. v. Rahtjen's American Composition Co., 183 U.S. 1,
9 (1901); see 1 NIms, op. cit. supra note 4, at 579-80; DERENBERG, TRADE-MARK
PROTECTION AND UNFAIR TRADING 625 (1936); Derenberg, "Shredded Wheat"-The
Still-Born Trade-mark, 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 376 (1939).
8. Acetyl salicylic acid. Druggists were of course thoroughly conversant with
the term through Bayer's advertising. There was also evidence that the term had
become somewhat familiar to the public through usage in dispensing the drug under
prescription and in sales by patent infringers. See Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co.,
272 Fed. 505, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
9. Decided as a question of fact: DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Products Co.,
85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1936); Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 108 F. Supp. 845
(D.N.J. 1952), aff'd, 206 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1953); Winthrop Chemical Co. v. Blackman, 246 App. Div. 234, 285 N.Y. Supp. 443 (1st Dep't 1936).
10. See H. A. Metz Laboratories, Inc. v. Blaclnan, 153 Misc. 171, 177, 275 N.Y.
Supp. 407, 414 (Sup. Ct. 1934). In this case, the court granted protection even though
the trademark "Pyramidon" had become so widely generalized as to be included in a
dictionary as the name of the product.
11. It is clear that the court was applying Bayer here, since it gave as its only

authority illustration three of

RESTATEMENT, TORTS

§ 735 (1938).

This illustration

adopts Bayer on its facts. But cf. Vibroplex Co. v. J. H. Bunnell & Co., 23 F.2d 490
(2d Cir. 1928) (dichotomy not applied). The dichotomy apparently found its origin
in Ford v. Foster, L.R. 7 Ch. App. 611 (1872) ("Eureka" shirts). In that case the
trademark had become generic as to retailers, but not as to consumers.
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How-

ever, preserving competition in the consumer market is of more practical
importance than in sales to retailers,' 3 since the consumer ultimately controls which brand the retailer in turn will buy to keep his shelves stocked.
Nevertheless, protection in sales to retailers should be granted, provided
that they can distinguish product from brand, in order to prevent competitors from deceptively passing off their brand under the guise of the
established trademark. The instant case, however, differs from Bayer

in that dextro-amphetamine sulphate is a prescription drug, there being
therefore three categories of people who come into contact with it: consumers, physicians, and druggists. It would seem that the court correctly
excluded examination of the consumers' knowledge, since the decision as to
which drug should be prescribed and the choice between brands belong
ultimately to the physician. 1 4 However, if by referring to physicians and
druggists conjunctively throughout its opinion 15 the court intended to
suggest 16 that they should be considered together as one class, it would
seem to be a misapplication of Bayer. So far as competition for cash sales
is concerned, the position of physicians in the instant case is closely
analogous to that of the public in Bayer, since their prescriptions control
what the druggist will sell. Their knowledge should therefore be examined separately in order to include the possibility of partial protection. If,
in prescribing "Dexedrine," they do not intend to specify a particular
brand,' 7 then druggists should be allowed to supply any other brand of

dextro-amphetamine sulphate even though absolute protection of the trade12. In Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 Fed. 960 (2d Cir.
1918), Judge Learned Hand, sitting as circuit judge, had distinguished between classes
of buyers in ordering qualified protection of the distinctive shape of the plaintiff
manufacturer's patent-expired product. Where the last purchaser received it in
cartons, the competitor was allowed to put a picture of the product on the outside,
since its cartons were dissimilar to the plaintiff's. However, where the last purchaser received the product outside the carton, the competitor was required to mark
it in some distinguishing fashion. See DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Products
Co., 85 F.2d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 1936). Protection of the trademark may also be restricted
to the geographical territory in which it has been used. Hanover Star Milling Co. v.
Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916).
13. A practical example can be inferred from the fact that the defendant in Bayer
did not appeal.
14. Since competition must be preserved at the level where there is effective
control over demand, if it could be shown that in a substantial number of instances
physicians do not in fact consciously exercise the power over prescription, but passively comply with requests from consumers, then consumer understanding would be
relevant to a determination of whether the trademark had become generic. Where,
however, as in the instant case, there was no evidence in the record of such practices,
consumer knowledge seems clearly irrelevant.
15. Instant case at 195.
16. Though it was unnecessary in view of the manner in which the case arose, it
is unfortunate that the court, having decided to adopt the Bayer doctrine, did not
attempt, for future guidance, a fuller declaration of its application to prescription
drugs.
17. It is not necessary that they know the name of the manufacturer, so long as
they understand that "Dexedrine" is the trademark of some manufacturer upon whom
they rely. See Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 Fed. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921);
Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARv. L. REv. 813, 816
(1927).
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mark is granted in sales by manufacturers.' 8 However, an alleged infringer will probably meet with practical difficulty in trying to prove that
such is the case; the huge grants of money and free drugs, made each year
by the major drug houses to foundations and private practitioners for
research and experimental purposes, fosters a favorable attitude among
doctors which undoubtedly facilitates the obtaining of affidavits. 19 This
favorable attitude, combined with the constant personal advertising methods
used by the large drug houses 20 and the fact that a physician does not bear
the burden of cash payment, might possibly result in physicians prescribing
a certain brand name more through custom than through a conscious desire
to specify it. In addition, habit ingrained over the life of the patent would
be an important element in the instant case, but prescription through habit
could occur to any trademarked drug,2 ' thereby rendering competition just
as ineffectual as if the trademark had become generic. However, the test
22
to be applied in these cases should be knowledge of the buyer, not habit,
for so long as a trademark fulfills its primary function of indicating to
buyers that the goods emanate from some particular, though anonymous,
manufacturer,2 3 the manufacturer should not be penalized for exploiting
24
it through forceful advertising and promotion.
The statement in the instant case that knowledge of the public is
irrelevant will greatly relieve prescription drug manufacturers. They can
adhere to their "ethical" policies in refusing to advertise direct to the public
without fear that a trademark may be lost because those members of the
public who may be familiar with it may consider it to be the generic name
of a drug.25 This is also the first federal circuit court to sustain the trade18. The court apparently also overlooked the fact that under Bayer the burden of
proof appears to rest on the defendant. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., supra note 16,
at 509. This failure was probably occasioned by the fact that the plaintiff itself seems
to have seized the burden. Brief for Appellees, p. 64. The burden is heightened by
the Lanham Trade-Mark Act, which provides a presumption of validity for all registered trademarks. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (1946).
19. The court in the present case noted that the record "abounds" with affidavits
brought forward by plaintiff Smith Kline & French, but mentioned none produced by
the defendant. Instant case at 195.
20. These methods are called "detailing." See DICTIONARY OF MARKING TERMS,
UNITED STATES USAGE 32 (Int'l Chamber of Comm. ed. 1952).
21. Logically, it would seem that technical trademarks on unpatented products
can become generic in the same manner as those on patented products. Cf. Brooten
v. Oregon Kelp Ore Products Co., 24 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1928). But courts have been
reluctant so to hold. See Selchow v. Baker, 93 N.Y. 59, 66 (1883); DERENBERG,
TRADE-MARK PROTECTION AND UNFAIR TRADING 615-9 (1936).
22. Administration of a test based on habit instead of knowledge would be extremely difficult, since few physicians would admit that they wrote prescriptions in
such a manner.
23. DERENBERG, op. cit. supra note 20, at 35. The Lanham Trade-Mark Act
defines a trademark as ". . . any word . . . adopted and used by a manufacturer
. . . to identify his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by
others." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1946).
24. Habit should only be considered as a factor in determining whether the manufacturer has attained a position of such overwhelming power that he falls within the
monopoly provision of §2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §.2 (1946). At that time
a proper sanction might be withdrawal of his right to exclusive use of the trademark.
25. "Ethical" advertising was probably originated in order to distinguish the
products of the larger drug houses from those sold in medicine shows. Aside from
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mark of a patent-expired product on the articulated ground that the manufacturer had succeeded in educating his buyers to know an alternate name
(i.e., dextro-amphetamine sulphate).26 The result will therefore be welcomed not only by the drug industry, but also by all manufacturers who
27
have directed their advertising policies toward that end.
tradition, the practice has probably been preserved for practical business reasons. Not
only would advertising direct to the public cheapen the product in the eyes of doctors,
it would also antagonize them by stimulating a demand which would result in undesired pressure on their prescriptions. Moreover, the maxim that familiarity breeds
contempt might have a practical application hire, forcing a reduction in purchase price
to consumers. For these reasons, and because the proportionately small amount of
patented drugs sold by major drug houses would not justify the enormous expenditure
necessary to educate the general public, it is doubtful that a contrary statement in
the instant case would have worked any change in established "ethical" policies.
26. Such a holding was implicit in Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 206 F.2d
144 (3d Cir. 1953), but the court concerned itself primarily with whether the trademark was descriptive. Trademarks have been sustained in circuit courts where they
cover an entire line of different products, on the ground that alternate names must
necessarily be used to distinguish the products from each other. Telechron, Inc. 'v.
Telicon Corp., 198 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1952); Enders Razor Co. v. Christy Co., 85
F.2d 195 (6th Cir. 1936) ; see 1 Nims, op. cit. supra note 4, at 582.
27. The ordinary practice is to place the trademark and generic name in juxtaposition so that the buyer becomes familiar with both simultaneously. See J.A.M.A.
(Oct. 10, 1953) (advertisements, e.g., pp. 16, 20, 38, 43) ; Friedman, How Advertisers
Protect Their Trademarks, 44 ADVERTISING AGENc 73 (Feb. 1951).

